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Abstract. Due to the growing importance of the role that software plays
in critical systems, software verification process is required to be rigor-
ous and reliable. It is well-known that test activities cannot detect all
the defects in safety-critical real time software systems. One way of com-
plementing the test activities is through formal verification. Two useful
formal verification techniques are deductive verification and model check-
ing, which allow programs to be statically checked for defects. This paper
explores both techniques, by employing the CBMC and Jessie/Frama-C
tools in the context of a safety-critical real time software system.
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1 Introduction
The important role that software plays in critical systems is very well recog-
nized. Some accidents with serious consequences have been caused by errors in
the software of safety-critical real-time systems. Despite its importance, the area
of software testing does not yet have a definitive solution to achieve predictabil-
ity in real-time systems. A complementary technique that can help ensure the
reliability of real-time systems is the use of formal static analysis of source code.
This paper explores software model checking and deductive verification tech-
niques, by employing the CBMC and Jessie/Frama-C tools, in the context of
a safety-critical real time software system. The rationale for this work was to
obtain useful insights on the difficulties of applying the techniques and the cor-
responding tools, as well as on how they could be used in a complementary way
to improve the software verification process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the verification approach
and notes related works. Section 3 shows the practical experience. Finally, Sec-
tion 4 is the conclusion, with a discussion about specific issues, and future works.
2 Verification Approach
Tools used. Software formal verification tools can be helpful in proving the cor-
rectness of programs. CBMC is a Bounded Model Checker tool used for analyzing
programs written in ANSI-C language [11]. The bounded model checking tech-
nique is a type of software model checking that makes symbolic execution based
on SAT procedures. The bounded model checking considers counterexamples of
a particular length and generates a propositional formula that is satisfiable if
and only if such a counterexample exists [1].
Jessie/Frama-C is a tool that allows the users to perform deductive verifi-
cation of C programs [10]. The deductive verification technique generates au-
tomatically logic formulas called verification conditions (VCs) with the use of
techniques such as Dijkstra’s weakest precondition calculus. The generated for-
mulas shall be checked valid hopefully by automatic theorem provers, which are
tools that find evidence of properties of a system from a set of axioms. The
automatic theorems provers used are Alt-Ergo, Simplify, CVC3, Z3, and Gappa.
Approach. The verification approach consists of the following steps:
1. Identification of properties to be verified from the requirements;
2. Annotation of the source code according to specification language;
3. Execution of static analysis.
Selecting properties for any kind of verification is an activity that has not yet
been well systematized. Nevertheless, two main classes of properties can be ver-
ified: behavior (expressed through preconditions and postconditions) and safety.
Safety properties encompass for instance memory safety, integer safety, and nu-
meric overflow. The extraction of properties from software requirements applies
to behavior analysis. The starting point is to look up the traceability matrix
for finding functions that implement requirements, and analyzing the associated
comments. The notation of Hoare Logic was chosen to express behavior proper-
ties [3]: a precondition and a postcondition must be identified for each function.
The next step is to identify into source code the variables that represent the
detected properties and translate these properties to a specific notation of each
tool.In the step of translating properties to annotation the notion of contract was
used. The syntax of the annotation depended on the tool used. In the CBMC,
an assume/assert notation is used. This kind of annotation is easier to employ
because the assert clause is a feature embedded in C language. The Jessie uses
the ANSI-C Specification Language (ACSL) [10].
The static analysis then analysis starts with safety analysis. After, the be-
havior analysis is executed considering the properties extracted. For each type of
analysis, various checks are necessary to perform until it to be possible to estab-
lish with some certainty whether or not it is possible to prove a specific property.
If not, a manual inspection is necessary. The source code annotation and static
analysis are activities that must be executed together. The annotations need to
be inserted and checked incrementally. When safety analysis is executed, some
annotations may coincide with the annotations related to behavior analysis.
Scenario. The software used in the experiments was for a spacecraft capable
of launching satellites weighing maximum 350 kg at altitudes up to 1000 km [5].
The embedded software is a critical real-time one, whose main assignment is
to perform the functions of initiation, verification, and control of the vehicle.
The source code consists of approximately 15 KLOC of C code distributed in
120 files. The selected part of the source code is related with flight control, the
most critical part of the code. For simplification, only 9 functions related to
the first stage of the flight control were analyzed. In the first stage, navigation
and attitude control algorithms are run. The case study had 368 SLOC, 37
statements, 237 assignments, 8 loops, 54 calls, 1 goto, and 52 pointer accesses.
Related work. Works that employ the CBMC and Jessie/Frama-C tools have
reported their successful use in industry. Hollas applies deductive verification
technique in a critical software and shows that the requirements can be verified
as a successful proof of concept [4]. In [6], the CBMC is used to detect bugs in the
driver software for a flash memory that was previously not detected. The CBMC
is also used in a complementary way to test field [8]. The work concludes that the
tool is enough developed to be used in the industrial setting. Other works present
a comparison among static analysis tools using CBMC or Jessie/Frama-C, not
specifically between CBMC and Frama-C tools [7][2][9]. In the literature, it is
not very well established the main difficulties of using CBMC or Jessie/Frama-C
nor how they can be used in a complementary way.
3 Case Study
The conducted experiments are illustrated by the following sample, which started
with the extraction of properties and ended with the formal analysis.
The properties were extracted from software requirements. The selected soft-
ware requirement was: “The software should compute the values to movable noz-
zle activation”. The traceability matrix helped to find that function1() attended
the software requirement. After found it, comments in the source code helped
to obtain a more detailed description about the requirement implementation:
“If the largest absolute value between the two angles exceeds the saturation value
defined by LIMIT, it limits this maximum, with the new values (proportionately
reduced, in absolute values) rewritten in their respective addresses.” The inout
plugin of Frama-C helped in the process of identifying annotations generating
a list with all the imperatives and operational inputs/outputs for function1().
There were two pointers that are input/output for the function1(). Now, all the
information available must be understood and the property can be depicted (in
a textual form) as a precondition and postcondition: precondition = valid values
to pointers; postcondition = limited values between -LIMIT and +LIMIT angles.
The previously identified properties were related to the behavior analysis.
However, they were used for safety analysis also. The annotations in Jessie/Frama-
C were represented by the ACSL language (left side) while in CBMC (right side)
assertions were used (but note the precondition was validated in another way).
/*@requires \valid(AB_Ptr) && \valid(CD_Ptr);
@ assigns *AB_Ptr; @ assigns *CD_Ptr;
@ ensures \abs(*AB_Ptr) <= LIMIT;
@ ensures \abs(*CD_Ptr) <= LIMIT;@*/
__CPROVER_assert(fabs(AB_Ptr) <= LIMIT);
__CPROVER_assert(fabs(CD_Ptr) <= LIMIT);
After annotating the source code, the verification was started. With CBMC
tool, the first activity was to execute the command to show claims, i.e., an
indicative of possible flaws in the source code. The results could help find traces of
the type of verification required for behavior and safety analysis. In the example,
6 claims were generated related to not a number check and division by zero.
For example, in float check, the counterexample showed that if the pointer is
associated with infinity value, the result of the computation will be not a number
(NaN), which is an invalid value:
ABPtr=+inf (01111111100000000000000000000000)
Violated property: NaN on / !(isnan(((double)(*ABPtr) * 0.052360) / max))
VERIFICATION FAILED
In this case, the dereferencing failure can be checked by adding a wrapper that
sets the pointers the way expected. This kind of solution is based on conditional
verification, in which is necessary to impose some clauses to be possibly checked.
Therefore, this stub can help the SAT Solver. In the example, a main function
was added, invoking the function to establish, in an indirect form, that the
pointer passed to the function was valid. To solve the issue related to not a
number, it was necessary to use non-determinism functions in the main function
and assume to ensure that the pointer is not infinity and NaN:
void main(){
float AB_Ptr, CD_Ptr;
AB_Ptr=nondet_float();
CD_Ptr=nondet_float();
__CPROVER_assume(!__CPROVER_isnan(AB_Ptr) && !__CPROVER_isinf(AB_Ptr));
__CPROVER_assume(!__CPROVER_isnan(CD_Ptr) && !__CPROVER_isinf(CD_Ptr));
function1(&AB_Ptr,&CD_Ptr);
}
With the Jessie tool, the metrics plugin of Frama-C helped to think in the
required annotations such as the claims in the CBMC tool. The metrics plugin
provided an overview about what should be checked such as accesses to pointer
and existence of loops. For example, the metrics for function1() showed that
there are six pointer acesses that needs attention. The inout plugin helped in
the process of identifying annotations. In the first execution of the example,
considering the memory safety, the VCs about dereferencing pointer failure were
generated. It was necessary to insert annotations related to the validity of point-
ers. This annotation is also part of the behavior analysis and is equivalent to
annotations requires showed before. Tables 1 and 2 show the verification results
for CBMC and Jessie. Table 3 shows the final results of safety and behavior
analysis of all the experiments using the CBMC and the Jessie/Frama-C tools.
4 Conclusions, Discussion, and Future Work
The presented work applies two tools for software formal verification on safety
critical real time software. In the past, the only way to validate the correctness
Table 1. Function1 checked by CBMC
Analysis Check Proved/VCs
Safety Bounds -
Pointer 4/4
Division by zero 2/2
Signed overflow -
Unsigned overflow -
Float NaN 4/4
Behavior Postcondition 0/2
Total 10/12
Table 2. Function1 checked by Jessie
Analysis Check Proved/VCs
Memory Safety Division by zero 3/3
Pointer dereferencing 2/2
Integer Safety - -
Termination - -
Float safety Pointer dereferencing 3/3
FP 12/12
Default behavior Postcondition 12/16
Total 32/36
Table 3. Results of Jessie and CBMC tools
Function Proved/VCs Not proved Proved/VCs Not proved
Jessie Jessie CBMC CBMC
function1 32/36 postcondition 10/12 postcondition
function2 400/566 FP overflow 12/39 NaN,postcondition
function3 241/286 pointer dereferencing, postcondition 323/323 -
function4 67/88 pointer dereferencing, loop invariant 34/36 postcondition
FP overflow
function5 214/280 pointer dereferencing, FP overflow 18/18 -
function6 14/18 poscondition 3/3 -
function7 10/10 - 35/35 -
function8 443/502 assertion, FP overflow 0/0 -
function9 0/0 - 0/0 -
of software was the tests. However, for this kind of application, the formal tech-
niques can now be considered as an important resource in a software verification
process. The power of the software formal verification is remarkable. Some inter-
esting aspects of each tool are worth being discussed: contracts, counterexamples,
specification language, and checks.
In Jessie, the concept of function contracts is part of the ACSL. In CBMC,
there is no explicit idea to contracts, but it is possible to simulate contracts
with the concept of assume-guarantee reasoning. In this case, the verification
can be made in every software unit using the clause assume/asserts in place
of the function called. One of the main advantages of CBMC is to generate
a counterexample, explaining the reasons why determined property failed. The
counterexample provides the program state, showing the values of variables in
situation of errors. In Jessie, the output of verification using a graphics interface
shows each VC in the context of a proof, making the comprehension harder.
With respect to annotation languages, CBMC is much more restricted than
Jessie. CBMC represents assumptions, assertions, and a kind of built-in library.
Jessie uses the language ACSL which has a richer representation for annotations
and allows the code to be annotated considering, for example, issues related
with loop invariant and function contract that contains several named behaviors.
Among these checks, the most difficult to prove is the one related to the float
point arithmetic. Most of the VCs not proved are of this type. One justification
is that the floating-point provers are not developed to address this type of check
automatically. One solution could be to use a proof assistant where it is necessary
to write the proof manually. Another important check is the loop invariant, which
helps to understand why the program is correct. This feature is made explicit
by specific annotation in ACSL. In CBMC, it is not possible to specify loop
invariants only unwind loops.
At the end of the analysis, both tools produce interesting outputs. Jessie
produces a model of the semantics of a program through the use of annotations.
This information can be used as documentation and source to test cases. The
counterexamples generated by CBMC can also be used to produce test cases. The
main challenge of both tools is to ensure that the specifications represented by
annotations are correct. All work can be lost if specifications do not represent the
correct behavior, i.e., meet the requirements. These annotations, proved correct,
are a valuable source for the documentation field.
So, in the software verification process, both tools help to identify faults,
which is the main use of these tools. The use of annotations is useful for the
documentation field if used to know how the program works, for future mod-
ifications, and for learning. Despite the work of employing the two tools in a
software verification process, the benefit is worth than the effort. Moreover, the
effort to write pre and postcondition for a function can be reused by both tools.
Future works will include the formal verification of others parts of the study
case. Also, the investigation of a representation of the properties with some
temporal logic with the help of ontology. In addition, it would be interesting
explore the generation of test cases based on these tools.
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